Rights against Exploitation, Freedom of Religion and Minority Rights (Articles 23–30)

Right against exploitation (Articles 23–24)

Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings, begar (forced labour without payment) and other similar forms of forced labour. It protects citizens and non-citizens, and applies against both the State and private persons. "Traffic in human beings" includes selling and buying men, women and children, immoral traffic in women and children, and bonded labour. Laws giving effect to it include the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, the Minimum Wages Act (now part of the Code on Wages, 2019) and the Equal Remuneration Act. In PUDR (Asiad Workers, 1982) the Court held that paying less than the minimum wage amounts to "forced labour" because economic compulsion can force people to work. The State may, however, impose compulsory service for public purposes – such as military service or social service – without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste or class.

Article 24 prohibits employment of children below 14 years in any factory, mine or other hazardous activity. It does not prohibit harmless or innocent work. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2016 (renaming the 1986 Act) bans employment of children below 14 in all occupations and processes, except helping the family in non-hazardous family enterprises after school hours and as artists in the entertainment industry, and prohibits employing adolescents (14–18) in hazardous occupations. In M.C. Mehta v State of Tamil Nadu (1996) the Court directed creation of a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund.

Freedom of religion (Articles 25–28)

Article 25 – freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. Available to all persons. It includes:

• conscience – inner freedom to mould one's relation with God;
• profession – declaring one's beliefs openly;
• practice – performing rituals and showing beliefs;
• propagation – spreading one's religion, but not a right to convert another person (Rev. Stainislaus, 1977, upheld state anti-conversion laws dealing with force, fraud or allurement).

Restrictions: public order, morality and health, and other provisions of Part III. The State may regulate secular activities associated with religion (economic, financial, political) and provide for social welfare and reform, including opening Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. "Hindus" here includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. Explanation I protects the wearing and carrying of kirpans by Sikhs.

Essential religious practices test. Courts protect only practices that are essential and integral to a religion (Shirur Mutt, 1954). This test was applied in Shayara Bano (2017) (instant triple talaq set aside; later made an offence by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019) and in the Sabarimala judgment (2018), whose larger questions were referred to a nine-judge bench.

Article 26 – freedom to manage religious affairs. Every religious denomination or section can establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage its own affairs in matters of religion, own and acquire property, and administer such property in accordance with law. It is a collective right, subject to public order, morality and health (not to other Fundamental Rights).

Article 27 – freedom from taxes for promotion of a religion. No person can be compelled to pay taxes whose proceeds are specifically used for promoting or maintaining a particular religion. A fee for secular services (for example, pilgrimage arrangements) is allowed.

Article 28 – freedom from religious instruction.

• Institutions wholly maintained by the State: no religious instruction at all.
• Institutions administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust requiring religious instruction: allowed.
• Institutions recognised or aided by the State: religious instruction allowed only on a voluntary basis with consent (of the guardian, for minors).

Cultural and educational rights (Articles 29–30)

Article 29 protects any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture – it covers minorities and the majority alike – and says no citizen shall be denied admission to state-maintained or aided institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language.

Article 30 gives religious and linguistic minorities (only) the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The State must not discriminate in giving aid to them, and if it acquires their property, it must pay an amount that does not restrict or abrogate this right (added by the 44th Amendment).

Key judgments:

• T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002, eleven judges): minority status is to be determined state-wise, since states were reorganised on linguistic lines. Unaided minority institutions have more autonomy, but regulation for academic standards is allowed.
• St. Stephen's College (1992): aided minority institutions may reserve up to 50% seats for their community, the rest being open on merit (later diluted by T.M.A. Pai into a more flexible test).
• P.A. Inamdar (2005): the State cannot impose reservation policy on unaided minority and non-minority institutions – which led to Article 15(5) exempting minority institutions.
• AMU case (2024): a seven-judge bench overruled Azeez Basha (1967), holding that an institution does not lose minority status merely because it was incorporated by a statute; the actual status of Aligarh Muslim University was left to a regular bench.

Who is a minority? The Constitution does not define the term. The Centre has notified six religious minorities under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis (Zoroastrians) and Jains (Jains added in 2014). Linguistic minorities are determined state-wise; Article 350B created a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities.

Common traps

• Article 23 applies against private persons too; compulsory national service is a permitted exception.
• Article 24 bans children below 14 in hazardous work; the 2016 law extends the ban to all occupations with limited exceptions.
• Right to propagate does not include the right to convert (Stainislaus).
• Article 29 protects any section of citizens; Article 30 only minorities.
• Minority status is determined state-wise (T.M.A. Pai).

Practice: Mains question

*How has the "essential religious practices" test shaped the balance between religious freedom and reform? (150 words)*

Outline. Define the test from Shirur Mutt (1954): only practices essential to a religion receive protection under Articles 25 and 26. Show its use – Shayara Bano on instant triple talaq, Sabarimala on entry of women, and cases on temple administration. Note the criticism that judges must decide theological questions, and that a constitutional morality test (dignity and equality) may be more appropriate. The pending nine-judge reference is meant to settle the scope. Conclude that reform is constitutionally permitted under Article 25(2)(b), but courts must respect the autonomy of denominations under Article 26.

Practice: check your understanding

1. *Why can a state ban conversion by force or allurement?* Because Article 25 is subject to public order and does not include a right to convert others (Stainislaus).
2. *Can the majority community claim Article 29?* Yes – it protects any section of citizens with a distinct language, script or culture.
3. *Does Article 30 allow minority schools to be free of all regulation?* No. The State can regulate standards, teachers' qualifications and fairness in admission, but cannot destroy the minority character.