Internal Security Challenges and Security Forces

Major challenges

Constitutional basis

• "Public order" and "police" are State subjects (List II).
• Art. 355: it is the duty of the Union to protect every state against external aggression and internal disturbance.
• Art. 352 – national emergency on grounds of war, external aggression or armed rebellion (the term replaced "internal disturbance" in the 44th Amendment).

Security forces

Central Armed Police Forces (under the Ministry of Home Affairs):

The NSG ("Black Cats") is the counter-terror commando force. The Indian Coast Guard (Ministry of Defence) protects the maritime zones.

Key laws and agencies

• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – main anti-terror law (amended to let individuals be designated as terrorists in 2019).
• AFSPA, 1958 – special powers for the armed forces in "disturbed areas".
• National Investigation Agency (2008) – created after 26/11 to investigate terror cases.
• NATGRID – links databases for intelligence. The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) shares intelligence.

Background: what is internal security?

Internal security means protecting the country within its borders: maintaining public order, protecting citizens from insurgency and terrorism, and preserving the constitutional order. Under the Constitution, "public order" and "police" are state subjects (List II, entries 1 and 2). But Art. 355 places a duty on the Union to protect states against external aggression and internal disturbance. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) leads at the Centre.

The four main theatres

Causes of insurgency and extremism – the root analysis

• Development deficit: poverty, lack of roads, schools and health care in tribal regions.
• Governance deficit: absence of administration, corruption, alienation.
• Land and forest issues: displacement by mining and dams; weak implementation of the PESA Act and FRA.
• Identity issues: ethnic and linguistic aspirations (the North-East).
• External support: Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism, sanctuaries in neighbouring countries, funding networks.
• Radicalisation through social media.

Government strategy – "security + development + rights"

For LWE:

• the SAMADHAN doctrine (2017) – Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, Motivation and training, Actionable intelligence, Dashboard-based KPIs, Harnessing technology, Action plan for each theatre, No access to financing;
• road connectivity (RRP), mobile towers;
• skill centres;
• surrender-cum-rehabilitation;
• the Aspirational Districts programme.

For the North-East: talks and accords, development packages (PM-DevINE), and a calibrated withdrawal of AFSPA.

For terror:

• the UAPA (amended 2019 – individuals can be designated as terrorists);
• the NIA (2008, expanded powers in 2019);
• NATGRID;
• the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC);
• the NSG;
• coastal security after 26/11 (the coastal radar chain, the Coast Guard's lead role, the Sagar Kavach exercise).

Security forces – who does what

Police reforms – the long-pending need

In Prakash Singh (2006), the Supreme Court issued seven directives:

1. State Security Commissions;
2. a fixed tenure for the DGP (minimum two years) and selection from a UPSC-empanelled list;
3. a minimum tenure for operational officers;
4. separation of investigation from law and order;
5. Police Establishment Boards;
6. Police Complaints Authorities;
7. a National Security Commission.

Compliance is partial in many states. Other needs: more police (the sanctioned strength is about 155 per lakh population, below the UN's suggested norm), modernisation, forensic capacity (the BNSS 2023 makes forensic investigation mandatory for offences punishable with seven or more years), and community policing (Kerala's Janamaithri).

Case study: the decline of LWE in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand

Earlier, LWE areas had no roads, no mobile towers and no state presence. Security forces built forward operating bases, while roads and towers followed, together with banking and school services. The Greyhounds model of Andhra Pradesh (a specially trained state force) showed that state police capacity is crucial. Violence fell by over 70% from its 2010 peak. Lessons: sustained, coordinated operations + development + trust, though concerns remain about human rights and tribal displacement.

Common misconceptions

• "Internal security is purely a central subject." – Police and public order are state subjects; the Centre supports through CAPFs, intelligence and funds.
• "AFSPA applies everywhere in the North-East." – It has been withdrawn or reduced in many areas (Tripura 2015, Meghalaya 2018, and many districts of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur since 2022).
• "LWE is only a law-and-order problem." – The Planning Commission's expert group (2008) called it a development and governance problem too.

How UPSC asks it

Mains GS3 asks about the linkage between development and extremism, the role of CAPFs, the challenges in the North-East, police reforms, and external state and non-state actors. Prelims picks forces and their borders, and laws (UAPA, NIA, AFSPA).

Mains answer framework

Q-type: "Left-wing extremism is a development problem as much as a security problem. Discuss."

• Intro: LWE spread and decline.
• Development dimension: tribal alienation, land and forests, the absence of services → recruitment.
• Security dimension: armed cadres, IEDs, funding through extortion.
• Integrated approach: SAMADHAN, roads and towers, PESA and FRA implementation, surrender policy, good governance.
• Conclusion: "winning hearts and minds" alongside force.

Central Armed Police Forces at a glance